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He underscores Irish political scientist John McGarry 's contention that, with the sole 
exception oflndia, federations in the developing world employing mainly ethnicity to 
define component polities have an "abysmal track record." He therefore concludes that 
such a federation would further aggravate already frayed ethno-sectarian relations in Iraq. 
Although a veto on federal action for weaker groups might be helpful, such a palliative 
could lead to political paralysis at the center. And where, as in Iraq, there already has 
been ethno-sectarian strife, separation along ethno-sectarian lines may be the only way to 
prevent further violence (a method already, of course, employed in Iraq, especially with 
the unsightly and much-resented walling off of entire neighborhoods in Baghdad). Bear-
ing in mind the difficulties noted above and the large areas of mixed population in Iraq, 
Anderson posits a somewhat more flexible model mixing both ethno-sectarian and regional 
considerations for crafting federal sub-divisions. Still, he points out that establishing 
regional definitions and boundaries could well be a daunting challenge. This is especially 
the case in light of the ebb and flow of the geography ofregional administration in Iraq 
laid out so well in Richard Schofield's article. Furthermore, dominant groups might well 
be reluctant to break up their respective power bases in any significant way. 
As can readily be seen, these articles serve up more questions, albeit some very good 
ones, than viable solutions. Nonetheless, Vissar and Stansfield illustrate why those 
focusing on tactical military successes must look far deeper in search of a balanced 
formula for federal governance that offers a chance for long-term stability. There is no 
clear choice that by itself promises to greatly reduce Iraq's ominous and persistent ethno-
sectarian and other tensions. Even though representatives of different ethno-sectarian 
groups in the Baghdad government have been able to work together on certain issues, it is 
difficult to know whether that tendency can be extended to the broader mass of Iraqis 
beyond the Green Zone. 
Until some of the historical baggage, daunting challenges, potential solutions and 
contradictions laid out so well in this volume have been explored more thoroughly, observ-
ers should continue to heed General David Petraeus's repeated warnings (at least through 
April 2008) that, despite recent security gains on the ground, the overall situation in lraq 
remains "fragile. " 
A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition, by Alan Richards and John 
Waterbury. Westview Press, 2008. 474 pages. $50.00. 
Robert Looney, professor. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
Alan Richards and John Waterbury's A Political Economy of the Middle East has 
always been a bit hard to characterize. It is clearly intended to be used in serious university 
courses about the socioeconomic problems facing the region, but it is much more than a 
textbook. Starting with the first edition in 1990, the volume has exposed several generations of 
policy makers and concerned observers to the complexity and interdependence of the eco-
nomic, social, political, religious and historical forces shaping events in the region. Yet, much to 
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the dismay of some Middle East experts, Richards and Waterbury do not subscribe to the 
notion that the problems confronting this part of the world are fundamentally different 
than those found elsewhere. 
The strength of their approach is their application of a unique set of premises centering 
on three universal elements: strategies of economic transformation, the state agencies and 
actors that seek to implement them, and the social actors such as interest groups that 
react to and are shaped by them. "Each of the three vertices entails questions about the 
nature of the state, the emergence of economic interests, and the effects of development 
strategies." More precisely (p. 8), 
Economic growth and structural transformation have unintended outcomes to 
which state actors must respond. 
The state structure and fiscal , monetary and trade policy affect the rate and form 
of economic growth. 
Social actors mold state policy. Interest and pressure groups and, most broadly, 
proprietary classes seek to protect and promote their own interests through the 
state. In some cases, the influence of a particular social actor may be so strong 
that the state becomes its "instrument." 
The state shapes, even creates, social actors, including classes. 
Economic growth and structural transformation shape social actors. 
Social actors affect the rate and form of economic growth, not only indirectly 
through their impact on state policy, but also directly. 
Drawing on this framework, the authors proceed to diagnose the many underlying 
causes of the stream of events that have focused increased international attention on the 
region. From the various chapter titles one can gain a quick appreciation of the book's 
ambitious scope: Economic Growth and Structural Change, The Impact of Demographic 
Change, Human Capital, Water and Food Security, The Emergence of the Public Sector, 
Contradictions of State-led Growth, The Uncertain Career of the Washington Consensus, 
Urban Political Economy, Political Regimes, Solidarism and its Enemies, The Military and 
the State, and ls Islam the Solution? A final chapter examines regional economic integra-
tion and labor migration. 
The chapters do not focus on isolated issues, but rather form the basis of a dynamic 
mosaic that allows them to infer significant trends that might be missed by more superfi-
cial assessments: 
Between the publication of the first edition of this book in 1990 and today, cur-
rents that we identified in two previous editions have commingled and become 
more powerful. What was politically sustainable, albeit at the cost of heavy 
policing and repression, is no longer so. All regimes have begun to grapple with 
this reality, but, because the great majority have been in power for many years, 
the grappling is tentative and inconsistent. It has begun, typically, with passes at 
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economic reform and, less frequently, at political liberalization. The turn toward 
the market has been partial and hesitant - and, even where embraced enthusias-
tically, has not greatly reduced unemployment (p. 408). 
Their framework also provides immediate insights into emerging problems and offers 
policy guidance that, if heeded, could avoid countless failures and the loss of goodwill 
throughout the region. The response to 9111 provides a classic example. As Richards 
noted in a previous issue of Middle East Policy (Fall 2003, p. 72): 
lfwe have learned anything about improving development policy, we know that 
institutions matter greatly and that institutions can only be crafted from within a 
society. Outsiders can do little to reform legal systems, enhance accountability 
and (above all) improve the chances of success of a pacted transition to democ-
racy [i.e., a transition agreed upon by reformers within the government and 
moderates within the opposition]. 
Despite their many insights, the authors are not afraid to admit that at times their 
assumptions have perhaps led them astray. Richards, who is solely responsible for the 
revisions in the third edition, has changed his views on economic reform over the years, 
following a growing body of knowledge suggesting that the naive free market and free-
trade versions of the Washington Consensus are not the panacea he and many econo-
mists in the early 1990s thought them to be: 
Although the problems and contradictions of state-led growth were (and are) real 
enough, there was (and is) no simple, much less universal, set of institutional 
changes that can overcome them. The problems of economic growth and 
structural change are intractable, complex, murky and deeply, inescapably 
political. Sweeping "reform packages" were always suspect, if for no other 
reason than it is political folly to offend everyone at once - which is what the 
economic logic of the Washington Consensus often implied. Further, the benefits 
of reform are always uncertain, and losers may be better placed to act. As it has 
turned out, the benefits have often been mixed, unequally distributed, and poten-
tially destabilizing. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that regimes implemented economic-policy 
changes gradually and selectively. Regimes fear, with reason, that the full-scale 
embrace of the Washington Consensus entai ls a high risk of political 
destabilization .... Whether due to the inherent difficulties of implementing eco-
nomic policy or to the unevenness of reform, the results of economic reform 
have been relatively disappointing. Although in some countries economic perfor-
mance in the mid-to-late 1990s was considerably better than in the previous ten 
years, in no country has growth been strong enough to lower unemployment or 
significantly raise real wages and living standards, as has happened in East 
165 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
MIDDLE EAST Poucv, VOL. XV, No. 3, FALL 2008 
Asia .. .. Nor is there strong evidence that countries that embraced much of the 
Washington Consensus performed markedly better than those who eschewed 
many of the recommended changes (pp. 260-61 ). 
While the Bush administration is not taken directly to task, the message is there. From the 
start, U.S. economic policies in Iraq were based exclusively on the failed Washington 
Consensus. The economy collapsed, unemployment quickly rose to over 40 percent, and 
the country descended into chaos with no institutions or governmental safety nets in place 
to buffer the average Iraqi. Richards and Waterbury would probably note as above that 
" it was political folly that offended everyone at once." How different things might have 
been if officials in Washington had only taken the time to draw on the historical record so 
ably laid out in this book. 
What does the future hold? Wisely, the authors do not make any sweeping specula-
tions other than simply to warn that the forces are at work to move the region toward 
greater instability: 
It is a much more difficult time than 40 years ago, not merely because resources 
are so severely stretched against growing populations (recent upticks in oil prices 
notwithstanding), but also because so many experiments undertaken with confi-
dence and enthusiasm have failed and an entire political generation is burdened 
with fatigue and self-doubt. Tragically, political actors from both inside and 
outside the region have been increasingly lured by the siren song of militancy and 
violence as a solution to these deeply rooted problems. History strongly suggests 
that such a turn will only steer the ship onto the rocks. Part of the problem is the 
absence of clear, credible alternatives. State-led growth, the Washington Con-
sensus and (in Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia) political lslamism have all been 
tried, and all have produced decidedly mixed results. 
Thus, without tested models, without long-term strategies, and amid rising political 
violence, the Middle East has entered a period of uncertainty. In part, the suc-
cesses of recent decades, especially the establishment of a diverse, better-
educated middle class with growing expectations, will make the immediate future 
particularly challenging. (pp. 412-13). 
Ifthe book has a shortcoming, it might be the limited space devoted to globalization. 
The Middle East stands out as the least globalized area in the world. Arab intellectuals in 
particular are increasingly stressing the threat posed by globalization to their societies and 
ways of life. In recent years, a new wave of Arab writings on globalization have put 
forth the argument that Islamic nationalism, even in its most militant form, should be seen 
as a direct response to the cultural side effects of economic globalization. Why is 
globalization commonly viewed within the region as an American phenomenon? To 
some extent, the perceived failures of globalization throughout the region have fanned 
anti-Americanism and helped spawn a wave of new recruits to extremist causes. While 
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bits and pieces of this theme are touched on, given its contemporary importance, it would 
have been nice to see a new chapter devoted to this topic in the third edition. 
A brief review can never convey the richness and depth of works like A Political 
Economy of the Middle East. Those looking for quick, easy answers to many of the 
leading issues of the day will be disappointed. There are no one-page action plans or sets 
of bullet points that lend themselves to solving difficult challenges. However, those 
wishing a deep understanding of the complexities of the region will find A Political 
Economy of the Middle East invaluable in understanding the fundamental causes of the 
policy failures of the United States (and the West) over the years. Perhaps the tragedy 
of our time is that key policymakers in the West have unfortunately been largely oblivious 
to the wisdom and insights provided by this masterwork. 
Arguing the Just War in Islam, by John Kelsay. Harvard University Press, 2007. 263 
pages. including index, $24.95, hardcover. 
Sherifa Zuhur, research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College 
In a review of Arguing the Just War in Islam , lrshad Manji praised what she 
considers to be John Kelsay's attack on Islam (New York Times, Jan. 6, 2008), and, while 
I found the sensationalist assertions of the review off-putting and Manji's knowledge of 
Islamic doctrine limited, one must admit that lines are being drawn in the sand. Some 
academics are jumping on the bandwagon for the neo-Orientalist proposition of a "good 
Islam." While there are advantages and ambiguities in Kelsay's approach to Islamic 
thought here, his opening statement - that Islam is a contested notion (p. 9) - properly 
sets the stage for his discussion. 
Kelsay takes on several projects in this book. First, it is a well-written introduction to 
Islamic thought and certain current issues that will appeal to general readers interested in 
understanding the rules and context of arguments about jihad. The book also aims to 
explain the processes, though not the detailed methodology, of shariah thinking or reason-
ing, which is the basis of jiqh, or jurisprudence, the making of Islamic law. Another goal 
is to consider the possibilities for "Muslim democrats" (all of them residents of the United 
States, whom Kelsay identifies as Abdulaziz Sachedina of the University of Virginia; 
Abdullahi al-Na'im, a former Republican Brother and legal expert from the Sudan; and 
Khaled Aboul Fad!, an Egyptian legal expert). Kelsay highlights their divergence from 
militancy, including that ofal-Qaeda. Overall, Kelsay's book presents a linear intellectual 
history oflslam, explaining the Muslim "understanding" of its legacy of war and present-
ing short portraits of particular figures who are crucial to the debates about Islam and 
politics, Islam and the West and the ideological bent of activists from the Prophet 
Muhammad to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. 
Texts like Ahmadinejad's letter to President George W. Bush can be read in different 
ways, and my reading is not Kelsay's. But his approach is useful in expressing particular 
arguments about the role of religion in society. The posing of Muslim democrats against 
167 
